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1 Introduction
The Shapley value, introduced by Shapley (1953), is a well-known solution concept
for cooperative games that has attracted enormous attention by scholars; see, for
instance, Roth (1988), Monderer and Samet (2002), Winter (2002), and, Moretti
and Patrone (2008). It was defined following a deductive approach, as the unique
function satisfying some axioms. From those axioms Shapley derived the explicit
well-known formula for his value in terms of the marginal contributions of players.
Other remarkable characterizations of the Shapley value are given in Young (1985)
and Casajus (2014).
In section 6 of his work, Shapley describes a bargaining procedure that produces
the value of the game as an expected outcome. In the bargain, players agree to
play the game and form the grand coalition N in the following way: (1) starting
with a single player, the coalition adds one player at a time until everyone has
been admitted. (2) The order in which players join the coalition is determined by
chance, with all arrangements equally probable. (3) Each player, on his admission,
demands and is promised the amount his or her adherence to the group contributes
to the value of the coalition (as determined by the characteristic function).
Address(es) of author(s) should be given
Blinded Manuscript (Without authors names and affiliations) Click here to view linked References
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
2The Shapley-Shubik index, introduced in Shapley and Shubik (1954), restricts
the Shapley value to simple games. Shapley and Shubik adapted the bargaining
procedure proposed by Shapley (1953) for cooperative games to simple games.
That method has been criticized rightly by several authors as highly artificial (see,
for instance, Luce and Raiffa (1957) or Brams (1975)). However, an alternative
model was not proposed until 42 years later when Felsenthal and Machover (1996)
published their work. The deductive approach instead had to wait for 21 years,
until Dubey (1975) was able to replace the additivity axiom with the transfer
axiom to characterize the Shapley-Shubik index uniquely for simple games.
In the seminal bargaining procedure for simple games by Shapley and Shubik,
players, usually called voters therein, are willing to vote for some bill, they vote
in a randomly chosen order and all n! orderings are equally likely. As soon as
the proposal is approved, the last voter is the pivotal player who takes credit for
having passed it. The Shapley-Shubik index is the ratio of the number of times
the player is pivotal under that scheme to n! (the total number of orderings). The
index indeed is the probability of each player being pivotal and, thus, it always is
a number between 0 and 1. Moreover, Shapley and Shubik noticed that their index
also is a measure of the power of players in blocking a resolution: if we suppose
that players are queuing in all possible orderings to vote against the proposal, then
the Shapley-Shubik index is the ratio of the number of times the player is the last
needed in order to block the bill to n!.
However, in simple games it does not seem natural to expect all voters to
vote in the same way (either all of them “yes” or all of them “no”). According
to Felsenthal and Machover (1996), the natural bargaining procedure in such a
context should allow voters to vote for any of the two options, while the idea of
pivotal voter, as the one who clinches the outcome, should still be the same. They
closed that gap in 1996 and established the appropriate bargaining procedure for
simple games. Although their approach also is valid for cooperative games, it is
simple games for which the bargaining model has the most trustworthy interpretation.
Felsenthal and Machover (1996) proved that their value for cooperative games
satisfies the axioms of the Shapley value and the equivalence of the two values
therefore followed. As they wrote in their paper, they avoided a “direct” proof
by proving the equivalence of the two expressions derived from the two bargain-
ing procedures for the Shapley-Shubik index. That direct approach, as noted by
Felsenthal and Machover (1996), implies a “combinatorial fact that is certainly non-
trivial, and may be of some independent interest”. In this paper, we provide a proof
of the direct result.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the prelimi-
naries. Section 3 provides the two results of the paper with their respective proofs.
Section 4, the Conclusion, highlights the findings of the paper.
2 Preliminaries
Let N be a finite fixed set of cardinality n. The elements of N are called players,
while a subset of N is called coalition. A coalitional game is a function v : 2N → R
such that v(∅) = 0. The dual v∗ of a game v is defined as v∗(S) = v(N)− v(NrS).
We denote the set of all coalitional games on the set N by CGN . A simple voting
game is a coalitional game that assumes values only in {0, 1}, is monotonic (that
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The Shapley value analyzed under the Felsenthal and Machover bargaining model 3
is, S ⊂ T =⇒ v(S) ≤ v(T )) and such that v(N) = 1. A coalition S is winning if
v(S) = 1; otherwise it is losing.
In the following we mainly use the notation from Felsenthal and Machover
(1996). Let s and d (short for sinister and dexter) denote the left-hand and right-
hand projections from the Cartesian product of two finite sets A × B, that is,
s(a, b) = a and d(a, b) = b. A roll-call is a map R : N → {1, 2, . . . , n}×{−1, 1}, such
that sR is a bijection from N to {1, 2, . . . , n}. Thus, sR induces a total order on N
and sR(a) = i means that a is the ith to vote. If dR(a) = 1 we say that a is positive
in R, meaning that a votes “yes” in R; if dR(a) = −1 we say that a is negative in
R, meaning that a votes “no” .
Let R be the set of all roll-calls, R+ be the set of roll-calls for which all players
are positive, and R− be the set of roll-calls for which all players are negative. It
holds that |R| = 2nn! and |R+| = |R−| = n!.
Given a roll-call R, the sets of positive and negative players in R are the
following: Y(R) = {x ∈ N : dR(x) = 1} and N (R) = {x ∈ N : dR(x) = −1}. For
any player a, we also will use the sets of positive and negative players who do not
vote after a: Y(R, a) = {x ∈ N : dR(x) = 1 ∧ sR(x) ≤ sR(a)} and N (R, a) = {x ∈
N : dR(x) = −1 ∧ sR(x) ≤ sR(a)}. Given a roll-call R and a player a, the marginal
contribution of a to v(Y(R)) is defined as
M(v,R, a) =
{
v(Y(R,a))− v(Y(R,a)r {a}) if dR(a) = 1
v∗(N (R,a))− v∗(N (R,a)r {a}) if dR(a) = −1.
(1)
The basic idea behind Equation (1) is that a positive player a expects to re-
ceive his marginal contribution to the coalition formed by those positive players
preceding him, while a negative player a expects to receive his marginal contribu-
tion to the coalition formed by the union of those positive players preceding him
and all players voting after him, no matter if they are positive or negative players.
If we regard v(N) as the total gain players can get by being positive players or as
the total blocking ability that negative players can exert, then M(v,R, a) is the
marginal contribution a player expects in his turn in the queue according to his
yes/no choice.
2.1 The Shapley value
The Shapley value is a function φ : CGN → R
n, that assigns to each player a real
number φa(v). Shapley (1953) and Shubik (1962) defined this function following a
deductive procedure, by showing that it is uniquely characterized by the axioms of
efficiency, null player, symmetry and additivity. In Section 6 of the former paper,
he also showed that φa(v) is the expected value ofM(v,R, a) in the space of positive
roll-calls, R+.
Theorem 1 (Shapley (1953)) For any player a ∈ N ,
φa(v) =
∑
R∈R+
M(v,R, a)
n!
. (2)
On the other hand, Felsenthal and Machover (1996) proved that φa(v) is the
expected value of M(v,R, a) in the space of roll-calls, R.
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4Theorem 2 (Felsenthal and Machover (1996)) For any player a ∈ N ,
φa(v) =
∑
R∈R
M(v,R, a)
2nn!
. (3)
The new interpretation given by Felsenthal and Machover is particularly inter-
esting in the context of simple games modeling a voting situation. Observe that for
each R ∈ R a unique voter a exists such that M(v,R, a) = 1, while M(v,R, x) = 0
for all x 6= a. This player a is pivotal in R for the game v and we write a = piv(v,R).
The pivotal player likewise can be characterized as the first player a such that if
Y(R) wins in v then Y(R,a) wins in v, and if Y(R) loses in v then N r N (R, a)
loses in v.
From Theorem 1 and the definition of pivotal player it follows:
Corollary 1 For any simple game v and player a ∈ N
φa(v) =
|{R ∈ R+ : a = piv(v,R)}|
n!
. (4)
From Theorem 2, Felsenthal and Machover (1996) deduced the following:
Corollary 2 For any simple game v and player a ∈ N
φa(v) =
|{R ∈ R : a = piv(v,R)}|
2nn!
. (5)
They remarked that formulas (3) and (5) are not useful from a practical computa-
tional point of view, while their value is conceptual. Formula (2) has an equivalent
expression, in terms of the marginal contributions of the characteristic function,
which is used widely to compute the Shapley value:
φa(v) =
∑
S⊆Nr{a}
ρ
n(s)[v(S ∪ {a})− v(S)], (6)
where s = |S| and ρn(s) = s!(n−s−1)!n! . The coefficient ρ
n(s), for each coalition
S ⊆ N \ {a}, is the rate of positive roll-calls that assign to player a the marginal
contribution v(S ∪{a})− v(S). The expression (6) is more compact and thus more
suitable for the computation of the value.
Theorem 3 (Shapley (1953)) The explicit formula (6) for φ is equivalent to (2)
for cooperative games and to (4) for simple games.
It would be interesting to derive an expression analogous to (6) in terms of
marginal contributions equivalent to (3). Of course, if such an expression exists,
it should be equivalent to (6) since as proved by Felsenthal and Machover (1996)
expressions (2) and (3) are equivalent. This equivalent expression also would be
useful to deduce (5) and would constitute an alternative proof of the Felsenthal
and Machover (1996) result, not requiring reference to axioms.
A second interest in obtaining that potential formula is the following. As (3)
is generalizable to ternary voting games (see Felsenthal and Machover (1997)), it
would be convenient to get a handy equivalent expression in terms of marginal
contributions for it. Actually, the formula we propose in the next section provides
the clue for getting an extension to ternary games, (j, 2)-simple games and mul-
tichoice cooperative games, while as far as we know, no generalizable expression
exists to these broader contexts from (6).
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The Shapley value analyzed under the Felsenthal and Machover bargaining model 5
3 A new explicit formula for the Shapley value
In this Section we introduce a value Φ for any a ∈ N as follows
Φa(v) =
∑
S⊆Nr{a}
Γ
n(s)[v(S ∪ {a}) − v(S)], (7)
where s = |S| and for any s = 0, . . . , n− 1:
Γ
n(s) =
s!
2nn!
s∑
k=0
(n− k − 1)!
(s− k)!
2k +
(n− s− 1)!
2nn!
n−s−1∑
k=0
(n− k − 1)!
(n− s− 1− k)!
2k. (8)
In the same way that the explicit formula (6) is equivalent to (2) for cooperative
games and to (4) for simple games, we have the following.
Theorem 4 The explicit formula (7), which describes a value Φ is equivalent to (3)
for cooperative games and to (5) for simple games.
Proof If a is a positive player in a roll-call R, then dR(a) = 1 and the marginal
contribution for player a is M(v,R, a) = v(Y(R,a)) − v(Y(R,a) r {a}). Consider
the coalition S = Y(R,a). Then the marginal contribution v(S) − v(S r {a}) is
accounted for all roll-calls with either :
– a being positive and S being the set of positive players preceding a, or
– a being negative and S being the union of the sets of positive players preceding
a and all subsequent players to a.
Thus, v(S)− v(S r {a}) is multiplied by the sum of the rates with respect to the
total number of roll-calls, i.e., 2nn! of the cardinalities of these two subsets of
roll-calls.
We start by calculating the rate of roll-calls in which a is positive and that are
associated with a given coalition S containing a. Let j be the number of negative
players preceding a in a roll-call, then j varies between 0 and n− s and thus:
1
2nn!


n−s∑
j=0
combinations
of players /∈ S
before a︷ ︸︸ ︷(
n− s
j
)
(s− 1 + j)!︸ ︷︷ ︸
orderings of players
before a
orderings
of players
after a︷ ︸︸ ︷
(n− s− j)! 2n−s−j︸ ︷︷ ︸
ways to vote
for players
after a


def
= γn(n− s)
Now we calculate the rate of roll-calls in which a is negative and that are
associated to a given coalition S containing a. Let j be the number of positive
players preceding a in a roll-call, then j varies between 0 and s− 1 and thus:
1
2nn!


s−1∑
j=0
combinations
of players ∈ S
before a︷ ︸︸ ︷(
s− 1
j
)
(n− s+ j)!︸ ︷︷ ︸
orderings of players
before a
orderings
of players
after a︷ ︸︸ ︷
(s− 1− j)! 2s−1−j︸ ︷︷ ︸
ways to vote
for players
after a


def
= γn(s− 1).
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6As the coefficient γn(s) + γn(n − s − 1) coincides with Γn(s) for all positive
integers n and s = 0,1, . . . , n− 1, we have
φa(v) =
∑
S⊆Nr{a}
[γn(s) + γn(n− s− 1)][v(S ∪ {a})− v(S)]
=
∑
S⊆Nr{a}
Γn(s)[v(S ∪ {a})− v(S)] = Φa(v)
From Theorem 4 and the result by Felsenthal and Machover (1996) establishing
equivalence between (3) and (2), one may directly deduce the following Corollary.
However, Felsenthal and Machover (1996) gave an indirect proof of the coincidence
of (3) and (2), by proving that the value defined in (3) satisfies Shapley’s axioms.
They did not prove the coincidence of those two expressions directly. Nevertheless,
in the last paragraph of their work, they wrote:
If one attempts to prove (3) by showing directly that the right-hand side of
(5) is equal to that of (4), one encounters rather formidable combinatorial
difficulties. This suggests that our Theorem and Corollary are a disguised
form of a combinatorial fact that is certainly non-trivial, and may be of
some independent interest.
The direct proof for the next Corollary 3 solves that combinatorial problem.
Corollary 3 The values Φ and φ for cooperative games coincide.
To prove Corollary 3 it is enough to deduce the equality of the coefficients
ρn(s) and Γn(s) for all positive integers n and 0 ≤ s ≤ n − 1, which is a direct
consequence of the next lemma since the equality ρn(s) = Γn(s) can be converted
into equation (9) by taking m = n− s− 1 and rearranging the terms.
The proof for Lemma 1 below is deduced by using the technique of generating
functions. However, we want to remark that the equality of coefficients also can
be derived by induction, which constitutes another intuitive alternative proof.
Let us recall the results on formal series and generating functions we are going
to use. Given a sequence {un}n the formal series of {un}n is
U(t) =
∑
n≥0
unt
n = u0 + u1t+ u2t
2 + . . .
The multiplication of two formal series U(t) and V (t) is given by
U(t) · V (t) =
(∑
n≥0
unt
n) · (∑
n≥0
vnt
n) = ∑
n≥0
( n∑
k=0
ukvn−k
)
t
n
.
Moreover, differentiating k times the geometric series 11−t =
∑
n≥0 t
n, we get the
following identity:
1
(1− t)k+1
=
∑
n≥0
(
n+ k
k
)
t
n
.
The previous identities are used to prove the next Lemma from which Corollary 3
is derived.
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Lemma 1 Let m and s be non-negative integers, then
s∑
k=0
(
m+ s− k
m
)
2k +
m∑
k=0
(
m+ s− k
s
)
2k = 2m+s+1. (9)
Proof Let us consider the sequence am,s =
∑s
k=0 (
m+s−k
m )2
k, the formal series of
am,s is∑
m≥0
{∑
s≥0
[ s∑
k=0
(
m+ s− k
m
)
2kts
]
u
m
}
=
∑
m≥0
[∑
s≥0
2sts
∑
s≥0
(
m+ s
m
)
t
s
]
u
m
=
∑
m≥0
[ 1
1− 2t
·
1
(1− t)m+1
]
u
m
=
1
1− 2t
∑
m≥0
1
(1− t)m+1
u
m
=
1
1− 2t
·
1
1− t− u
.
The two addends on the left-hand side of Equation (9) are symmetrical; thus,
1
1− 2t
·
1
1− t− u
+
1
1− 2u
·
1
1− t− u
=
2
(1− 2t)(1− 2u)
.
On the other hand, the formal series of the sequence bm,s = 2m+s+1 is∑
m≥0
{∑
s≥0
[
2m+s+1ts
]
u
m
}
= 2
∑
m≥0
[∑
s≥0
2sts2mum
]
= 2
1
1− 2t
·
∑
m≥0
2mum
= 2
1
1− 2t
1
1− 2u
and this completes the proof of the lemma.
4 Conclusion
Felsenthal and Machover (1996) provided a new interpretation of the Shapley
value in the probability space of roll-calls, not necessarily positive roll-calls, as the
expected value of the marginal contributions in that space. As a corollary, they ob-
tained a pivotal scheme for simple games, which becomes much more natural than
the one proposed by Shapley and Shubik (1954). For completeness, as themselves
indicated in the last paragraph of their paper, it lacked a combinatorial expression
for the explicit formula for computing the Shapley value on the probability space
of roll-calls. In this paper we report such a formula.
This new formula is not simpler than the classical one, but it allows one to
derive the equivalence between (4) and (5) without the use of axioms and to solve
the combinatorial problem quoted in Felsenthal and Machover (1996).
In addition, formula (5) has been extended to voting models with abstention
and several levels of approval, while no extensions of formula (4) are known to
those contexts. Therefore, we consider that the formula (7) obtained in this article
has great potential for extension to larger cooperative models.
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
8References
Brams SJ (1975) Game theory and politics. Free Press, New York, USA
Casajus A (2014) The Shapley value without efficiency and additivity.Mathematical
Social Sciences 68:1–4
Dubey P (1975) On the uniqueness of the Shapley value. International Journal of
Game Theory 4(3):131–139
Felsenthal DS, Machover M (1996) Alternative forms of the Shapley value and the
Shapley-Shubik index. Public Choice 87(3-4):315–318
Felsenthal DS, Machover M (1997) Ternary voting games. International Journal of
Game Theory 26(3):335–351
Luce RD, Raiffa H (1957) Games and decisions: introduction and critical survey.
Wiley, New York, USA
Monderer D, Samet D (2002) Variations on the Shapley value. Handbook of game
theory with economic applications 3:2055–2076
Moretti S, Patrone F (2008) Transversality of the Shapley value. Top 16(1):1–41
Roth AE (1988) Introduction to the Shapley value. The Shapley value pp 1–27
Shapley LS (1953) A value for n-person games. Contributions to the Theory of Games
2(28):307–317
Shapley LS, Shubik M (1954) A method for evaluating the distribution of power
in a committee system. American Political Science Review 48(03):787–792
Shubik M (1962) Incentives, decentralized control, the assignment of joint costs
and internal pricing. Management science 8(3):325–343
Winter E (2002) The Shapley value. Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Ap-
plications 3:2025–2054
Young HP (1985) Monotonic solutions of cooperative games. International Journal
of Game Theory 14(2):65–72
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
